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IN THE SUPREME C0 UR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

.JOHN J. SWEENEY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

HAPPY VALLEY, INC., a Utah cor-

poration,

Case No.
10259

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the matter involves an action by Plaintiff and Appellant for money
daimed to be due him from the Defendant and Respond~nt Happy Valley, Inc. under the terms of a written
contract, in which action Appellant alleges breach of the
contract, seeks a determination of his rights under such
contract, an accounting by Respondent for the money
due Appellant and for injunctive relief.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Although the Pretrial Order explicitly framed the
lk8Ul's and set the matter down for "jury trial," the
1

Judge before whom the case was tried determined at thl'
beginning of the trial that the matter ·was one stricth
for an equitable accounting and refused Appellant a jur;
trial. The Trial Court further limited the issues to h~
tried to an equitable accounting, resolved those issue'
against Appellant, fixed a formula upon which it decrterl
Respondent had to account, and directed that Respondent
forthwith account on such basis without making am
determination as to the amount owing.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks by this appeal to have the Suprenw
Court determine that the lower Court erred in its analysii
and determination of the issues and in its analysis ana
interpretation of the contract; that on the basis of tlw
agreement between the parties and the facts adduced at
the trial Appellant was and is entitled to be paid li1 I
Respondent in respect to the transfer of title of varioui
lots and parcels of property on the basis of a price or
amount greater than that accounted by Respondent; arnl
that Appellant was entitled to a jury trial in the deter·
mination of the issues.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about August 8, 1957, Appellant John J.
Sweeney (and other parties not involved in this action)
entered into a written Agreement with Respondent Happ)'
Valley, Inc. providing for the subdivision, development
and improvement of certain land located near the mouth
2

CTI'

of Big Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County, State of
rt ah. ( R. 49-56)

h
ry

The Agreement recites that First Party (Respondent
herPin) is the owner of, or entit1E>d to sell, certain land
~ituat(•d in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting
of approximately 366 acres; that it desires to develop the
said land and to subdivide a portion thereof for residential building lots and reserve a suitable portion thereof
for use as a golf course and country club. The Agreement
further recites that Second Party (of whom Appellant
is the only party presently interested therein) is to effect
the organization of a non-profit corporation under the
laws of the State of Utah, to be known as the Willow
Cn·ek Country Club, for the purpose of buying and deYPloping a portion of said Entire Premises sufficient in
area and terrain for an 18-hole golf course. (R. 49, 50)
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Paragraph 6 of said Agreement (with vvhich paragraph we are primarily concerned) provides that First
Party intends "to develop, subdivide, and sell as residential lots, and a shopping center in conjunction therewith, all of said Entire Premises, except the Club Premiso8. Said Entire Premises shall not be sold or developed
in any other manner except on the written consent of
Second Party." ( R. 51)
Said paragraph further provides that the "gross
)lrocerds of sales of all such property sold for residential
lot~ :,.:hall be divided" so that 75% would be paid to
Respondent (First Party) and the other 25%, after initial
dt><lnction of a certain amount to pay a proportionate

3
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part of the initial cost of acquisition of the properly,
should be paid to Second Party (Appellant and otlwrs.).

I
I

In the event any part of the Entire Premises ii
traded or exchanged for other land "that portion of thF
Entire Premises so traded shall he valued on the hasii
of its fair market value for the purpose of deterrninini
gross proceeds of sale and applying the 75%-25% ratio
hereinabove referred to."
Finally, Paragraph 6 provides that First Party shall
render an accounting to Second Party "not less fo.
quently than quarterly, showing all sales made from
the Entire Premises and showing the gross proceeds ol
sale, together with a showing of the distribution thmof
as provided in this paragraph. Sums due Second Party
under the provisions of this paragraph shall be paid
monthly." (R. 51, 52)
Paragraph 8 sets forth the respective interests of
the persons who comprise Second Party, including Appellant Sweeney who was and is the owner of 31.8% of
the 25% interest of Second Party. (R. 53) This interest
entitles Appellant to receive 7.75% of the total gross pro·
ceeds ref erred to in the contract. Since then, the other
persons comprising Second Party have transferred their
respective interests to Respondent (First Party) thereby
leaving Appellant as the only person entitled to share
with Respondent in the gross proceeds from the sale of
the "Entire Premises." Likewise, at the time the con·
tract was executed C. Taylor Burton, Owen \V. Bunker
and G. Kirk Graff owned all the stock of First ParlY
4

I
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I

(Respondent herein) in equal shares and were the ofi)..· II ficers and directors of the company. (R. 321) Prior to
the commencement of this action Graff sold his interest
in R<'fipondent corporation to Burton and Bunker.
Ii
\'I

Suhsequent to the execution of the foregoing contrart Res1rnndent provided with plans for a subdivision
and entered into a contract with American Insurance
Corporation about April 10, 1958, for the promotion
of sal<'fi of the residential lots. (R. 510) A preliminary
i;nhdivision plan was prepared indentifying individual
lots (Exhibit 31-P), listing "sales agency" contracts were
~xeeut<:'d with An1erican Housing on September 21, 1958,
for sale of individual lots ranging in price from $3,999.00
to $7,-1:99.00 (Exhibit 21-P). (R 512)
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·within less than a month after these listing agree111Pnts \Ycre signed three lots in the proposed subdivision
had he<>n sold and earnest money receipts obtained (Exhibit 30-P). One lot was sold to a Mr. Bain for $3,999.00,
one to Howard J. Ford for $4,999.00; and the other to
0. V. Hansen for $4,500.00 (Exhibit 30-P). However,
since the subdivision had not been approved it was nec0~sary to hold up sales so that no more were made
prior to the approval of the subdivision plat. (R. 380)
In fact, the earnest money agreements ref erred to above
wen• called and "options" were given to the parties.
(Exhibits 32-D, 33-D) Thereafter certain changes were
1nade in the subdivision plat and a portion only of the
Entire Premises was subdivided into four subdivisions
\Yi.th the lots being renumbered. The plat for subdivision
l \\'as filed and approved on November 4, 1959, after
lht- subdivision improvements were put in. (R. 366)
5
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During the interim the three principals of Respond.
ent corporation (Burton, Bunker and Graff) were ass('°'
ing themselves monthly for cash contributions to the
corporation "to keep up the uniform real estate con.
tracts underlying the subdivjsion, as \vell as to mah
payments on improvements being installed.'' (R. 366)
Shortly after subdivision 1, containing 40 lots, was
approved Respondent corporation conveyed to the thre,,
principals who were its sole stockholders, officers a111l
directors, 24 lots in that subdivision. (R. 323, 388, 507)
The plats for subdivisions 2 and 3 containing 110
lots, were recorded on April 5, 1961; and on .May lll,
1961, Respondent corporation conveyed to Owen \V. Buu
ker 1 lot in subdivision 1, 12 lots in subdivision 2 and 11
lots in subdivisjon 3. At the same time 5 lots in subdirision 2 and 19 lots in subdivision 3 were conveyed to G.
Kirk Grafff; and 3 lots in subdivision 2 and 21 lots in
subdivision 3 were conveyed to C. Taylor Burton. (R. 321,
388, 507, Exhibit 14-D)
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In a letter sent to Appellant under date of May .. u,
1961, Respondent corporation outlined certain difficulties
which it stated had been encountered in getting the subdivision plats approved and lots sold so that the individ•
•
11
ual officers "have had to make cash contributions.
Respondent then stated that these contributions "had
been secured to the sponsors by the corporation deeding
to them sufficient lots to equal the cash necessary to keep
the company's land payments current." The basis used
as value was stated to be $3,000.00 per lot which the letter
said had been established by outside appraisers (Exhibit
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J2-P). The appraisals referred to were received in evidencP in Exhibits 8-D through 13-D, inclusive. They are
dated in October and November, 1960, and August, 1961,
although they relate back to December, 1960. They involve only lots in subdivision 1 and were used in connection with an investigation by the Federal Government
"on tax questions concerning the valuation." (R. 371)

Two of the appraisals (Exhibits 8-D and 9-D) are
very general and give a value of an average of $3,000.00
per lot. Two other appraisals (Exhibits 9-D and 13-D)
\1we made in a more detailed manner and appraised the
lots at an average value of $3,500.00 and $3,450.00 per
lot rPs1wctively.
The corporate minutes of Respondent show that
on ~ ovember 4, 1959, the corporation was indebted to
eaeh of the three stockholders in the sum of $17,000.00
represented by unsecured notes, and that Mr. Bunker
was unwilling to make further contributions without
"some kind of security for a return of some of funds
already advanced. As a method of reducing the company's obligation to the principals he suggested each
taking title to some lots to offset some of the company's
borrowings. The lots would be taken at cost, after determining same, or $3,000.00 which was offered by Mr.
Shaw, or whichevPr was greater." (R. 35)
On some of the lots taken by the principals there
werp outstanding mortgages of $2,000.00 (R. 577) so
that the corporation received from the principals a reduction of $1,000.00 only on its indebtedness to them since
7

they individually assumed such mortgage indebtednesi.
(R. 579, Exhibit 42-P) Likewise a portion of the indebt.
edness O\\ling by Respondent company to its stockholders
(at least insofar as G. Kirk Graff was concerned) arose
from salary rather than from cash contributions. (R. 507)
In addition to the lots conveyed to the principals
Respondent made other transfers or sales.
On or about April 6, 1959, a tract of land approximately the size of one lot was conveyed to the Salt
Lake \Vater Conservancy District on ·which a well \\'a:'
located. (R. 31) This property is referred to throughout
the Record as the "wellsite."
On or about April 4, 1961, a small portion of lot~.
subdivision 2, was conveyed to a David L. Jessup tu
clarify the boundary line. (R. 32)
On or about January 29, 1962, Respondent conveyed
a tract of approximately 30 acres (surveyed by George
B. Gudgell to be 31.07 acres) (R. 275) to Twenty-Five
Associates, Inc. and R. E . .McConaughy in exchange for
their interest (as some of Second Party) in the contract
dated August 8, 1957. (R. 31, 32) Twenty-Five Assoc·
iates, Inc. owned 41.4% of Second Party's interest in
said contract and 1\1.r. McConaughy owned 9.5%. (R. 53)
On or about April 30, 1962, Respondent conveyed to
Estates, Inc. a tract of land in excess of two acres, com
prising a portion of several lots in subdivision 4 in ex·
change for the offsite improvement on Respondent's lots
in subdivision 4. (R. 32, 394-397)

8
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None of these transactions had ever been reported
to Appellant or accounted for by Respondent prior to
the trial (Exhibits 14-D, 15-D and 16-D). At the trial
Respondent acknowledged that an accounting had to be
made for the 30 acre tract conveyed to Twenty-Five
ARsociates, Inc. and McConaughy. (R. 268)
A few other lots were sold and conveyed to third
parties as reflected on the accountings rendered by Appellant. (Exhibits 14-D, 15-D and 16-D)
The balance of the lots remaining in subdivisions 1,
~. and ~i ( 33 in number) were sold under a contract to
Uordon and Bush, Inc. on July 15, 1963, for $181,500.00
or approximately $5,500.00 per lot. This contract inrolved a down payment of $500.00 only and allowed the
buyers four years to complete the purchase provided not
less than seven lots per year were paid for. (Exhibit 27-P)
Insofar as the other property comprising the "Entire
Promises'' is concerned a portion was subdivided as
rnbdivision 4; and the balance is yet to be developed.
After the present action was filed and on or about SeptemhPr, 1962, an additional four lots in subdivision 4
Were trnnsf erred each to C. Taylor Burton and to Owen
W. Bunker who by then were the sole stockholders of
the company. (R. 32) The consideration for the sale
iras still $3,000.00 per lot. (R. 324, 389)
Some of the lots conveyed to the principals were sold
by thPm to other individuals. For instance, on April 4,
l9G2, Burton transferred Lot 559 in subdivision 1 to
9

Gibbons and Reed Company for a credit of $6,250.00
on the balance owing to Gibbons and Reed Company by
Respondent company for offsite improvements. At the
same time Mr. Bunker transferred Lot 589 in subdivision
1 to Gibbons and Reed Company for a credit of $6,200.00
on such obligation owing by Respondent company. (R.
331, 91, 9·4) Other conveyances of lots by the principals
are set forth in the Answers to Interrogatories filed
by them. (R. 91-94) However, the Trial Court refused to
receive testimony with respect to many other such conveyances made. (R. 582-591)
The first formal accounting made by Respondent to
Appellant (or others of Second Party) on account of
any sales of lots by Respondent corporation was made
July 17, 1962. (R. 253, 1019, Exhibit 14-D). This account·
ing showed the number of lots conveyed by Respondent
to Mr. Burton, Mr. Bunker and Mr. Graff up to that
time. (Exhibit 14-D)
Following receipt of the July 17, 1962, accounting,
Appellant herein filed legal action against the Respond·
ent company and its officers and directors Owen W.
Bunker, C. Taylor Burton and G. Kirk Graff, said action
being filed on August 17, 1962 (R. 1-3) The Complaint
was thereafter amended twice. (R. 69, 121) Motions filed
on behalf of the individual Defendants were ultimately
granted by the Court (R. 175) ; and all causes of action
other than the Second Cause of Action were dismissed
prior to or in connection with the pretrial conference
held. (R. 175, 261)
10
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A pretrial was held on September 11, 1963. The
Pretrial Order enteered by the Court recites that the
"Second Cause of Action is an action for an accounting
for declaratory relief as to the rights of the Plaintiff
and for injunctive relief, all of which arises out of the
photostatic copy of the contract which is a part of the
file lwrein," entered into on August 8, 1957. (R. 195)
The issues framed by the Court as to the Second
Cause of Action are as follows:
"Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the
lots which were conveyed from the corporation to the
individual officers and directors of the corporation accounteecl for at any other value than that which was
fixed by those officers and directors at the time of such
conveyances ;
"l.

"2 "Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the
subdivided lots which were conveyed to other persons
than those mentioned above evaluated at any other figure
than that heretofore asserted by the corporation; and

"3. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the
undivided tracts of land which have heretofore been conveyed out of the corporation evaluateed as residential
lots, and if so, at what value." (R. 195)
In addition to the foregoing issues the Judge who
conducteed the pretrial further stated in the Pretrial
Order that the Plaintiff contends "That it is entitled
to a declaratory judgment determining his rights under
the August 8, 1957, contract as to accountings, time of

11

payment, and the rate and rnaun0r of dPvelopuwnt 0f
the properties subject of the AgrN~rnent." (R. 196)
The Pretrial Order further states:
"At the time of the pretrial it was stipulated and
agreed by and between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
that Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting as to the i1uproved lots conveyed by the Defendant. Defendant contends that the accountings should be predicated on tlw
actual gross proceeds received by the corporation for the
lots conveyed. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled
to an accounting based on the fair markc-t value of thr
property as residential lots at the times of com·r~·ancP."
"As to the unimproved property, which has been
conveyed by the Defendant, Defendant contends first
that Plaintiff is not entitled to an accounting on thi~
unimproved property. flo,vever, in the event the Court
determines that Plaintiff is so entitled to such an accounting, then it is Defendant's contention that such accounting
should be predicated only on the fair market value of
the property conveyed as unimproved property at the
time of the conveyance. The Plaintiff contends that they
are entitled to the fair market value of that property
as subdivided residential lots at that time." (R. 197)
The Pretrial Order then dirPcts that the ease ''be
set for jury trial" (such trial having been demanded by
Appellant herein) for December 9, 1963. (R. 194)
The matter came on for trial lwfore the Honorable
Merrill C. Faux, who dismissed the jury at the beginning

12

of the trial, because he determined the case involved only
an equitable accounting between the parties. Counsel
for Appellant at the time of trial excepted to the Court's
rnling-, stating that Plaintiff had filed a Demand for
.Jury rrrial and paid a fee, that Plaintiff was entitled
tu a jury (R. 249). Respondent was permitted to go for11ard with the proof by offering in evidence the accountings tlien·tofore made to Appellant on July 17, 1962
(}~xhihit 1--!:-D), December 26, 1962 (Exhibit 15-D), and
SqJtPmber 9, 1963 (Exhibit 16-D), following which the
Court stated that "it appears to the Court that the
c·harg·e is somewhat in the nature of an action in fraud
- ePrtain things have done here which you now seek
relief upon, saying that they have <lone, but <lone by
lJad faith so that it isn't simply a charge of breach of
rnntract ·where you ·would ask for certain damages and
proceed upon proof to the extent of preponderance but
that .mu may be required to make your proof clear and
ronvincing." (R. 259) Appellant replied that he did not
claim had faith, but rather that Respondent "entered
into this transaction with themselves."

"They conveyed from the corporation they
controlled, to themselves, this property." "What
we are claiming here, is that they have simply
breached the contract; doesn't matter whether
tht7 did it in good faith or not."
•'If they breached it, they breached it. We
claim the contract required them to make sales
which would require market value, and that they
made sales to themselves which did not establish
market value because who is the judge in a sale
to yourself - not yourself, of course. That is
our point. It isn't the question of bad faith, at
all. " (R. 2GO)

13

The Court then stated its view:
"Now, if you contend that they proceeded
under the contract and that the difference between
you is interpretation of the contract, then that
is probably for the Court to determine - what
is meant by the parties as sign their names to it.

* * *

"Second, this will be then - after I have
interpreted it - did the parties proceed in accordance with that interpretation~ That may be a
mixed question of law and fact." (R. 261)
After further discussion, the Court finally concluded:
"I am going to proceed as though this were
an action in equity for an accounting between the
parties . You have, by Stipulation, presented to
me now what the parties have offered to do in
a way of accounting.
"Plaintiff may proceed carrying the burden
of proof - carrying the burden of going forward
- and the burden of proof charging that, under
the contract, a proper accounting has not been
made or tendered." (R. 267)
The case thereupon proceeded to trial. Following
a rather protracted hearing lasting several days, during
which the examination of Appellant's witnesses was frequently and repeatedly interrupted for so-called "voir
dire'' examination, the Court rendered a memorandum
decision in which it:
1. Rejected the position of Appellant and that Re-

spondent was required to go forward with proof to
sustain the adequacy and propriety of the accounting by
clear and convincing evidence;

14

2. Rejected Appellant's claim that he should be
granted relief against Respondent "as for a breach of
contract'' ;

3. Rejected Appellant's request for a jury trial;
4. Determined that the matter had to be tried as an
equitable accounting;

' Appellant had the burden of
5. Determined that
proving the conduct of the Respondent corporation toward Appellant was dishonest and fraudulent;
G. Accepted evidence of fair market value as one
of the factors which would enable it to decide whether
Resopndent's actions were "so far from reasonable conduct that equity would require different standards than
those already used or proposed in the accounting;"

7. Commented that Appellant's witnesses on "fair
market value" gave the impression of having had "more
than necessary instruction" from Appellant "in hope that
they would reproduce his views;" while the testimony of
Respondent's witnesses was more helpful to the Court;
and
8. Concluded that Respondent must include in its
accounting interest on receipts from deferred payment
contracts and "must now promptly account and pay" in
accordance with the Court's decision and hereafter "account and pay promptly when there is something to
account and pay, at the time prescribed in the contract."
The Court otherwise resolved the issues in favor
of Respondent, denied any relief to Appellant, and di-

15

rected counsel for the Respondent corporation to prepare
appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
( R. 206-209)
Thereafter, the Court issued a supplemental decision
in which it specifically referred to the transfer of 31.07
acres to the Twenty-Five Associates and McConaughy.
Since the tract involved was zoned for Al use, the Court
concluded that the sale and purchase of the property as
a tract "\Yas necessarily as and for residential lots."
In addition the Court found that Respondent corporation
sold its equity in that tract for a consideration which,
as reported in the accounting made in open Court during
the course of the trial, was fair and reasonahle. (R. 210)
The Court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to it by Respondent (R. 211-218),
and rendered judgment in favor of the Respondent and
against the Appellant. (R. 219-221)
·Thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion to Alter and
Amend the Findings, Conclusions and Decree or in the
alternative for a new trial. (R. 230-234) The Court
denied the Motions in toto, but did make an amendment
to the Findings to the effect that Appellant "by his
act and conduct, and the negotiations with Happy Valley
held from time to time during the periods in question,
waived his contractual right to receive quarterly accountings and monthly payments under the terms of said
Agreement, as well as all interest on such payments to
the dates that the tenders of payments were made by
Happy Valley as more specifically set forth in Finding
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No. 14 on file herein." (R. 236) Appellant thereupon
filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 243)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES.

ln order to assist this Court in reviewing the various
claims of Appellant in respect to this matter, we have
sub-divided the discussion of this point into several specific sub-topics with respect to which Appellant classes
tlw Trial Court erred in its determination of the issues,
as follows:

The Trial Court erred in treating the case solely
as an action in the nature of an equitable accounting and
in refusing Appellant a jury trial.
A.

B. The Trial Court erred in determining that in
order to be entitled to relief Appellant had to prove
that the conduct of the principals of Respondent corporation in dealing with themselves in conveyances of real
property from Respondent corporation was dishonest
and fraudulent as to Appellant.
C. The Trial Court failed to consider and make
findings in respect to the rights of Appellant under the
terms of the contract for the development of the property,
the subject of the Agreement.
D. The Court erred in refusing to hear and receive
CPrtain testimony.
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A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TREATING THE
CASE SOLELY AS AN ACTION IN THE NATURE
OF AN EQUITABLE ACCOUNTING AND IN REFUSING APPELLANT A JURY TRIAL.

Although the Court may have understandably been
somewhat confused because of the background of this
case involving amended pleadings, additional parties and
previous Orders of the Court dismissing certain of the
Causes of Action and also dismissing the action as to all
individual parties, the Pretrial Order specifically sets
forth the issues which the Trial Court was called upon to
hear and determine. As to the Second Cause of Action
remaining the Order recites that it is "for an accounting
for declaratory relief as to the rights of the Plaintiff
and for injunctive relief" arising out of the contract dated
August 8, 1957. (R. 195)
The specific issues set out by the Order have little
or no relationship to any so-called action for an equitable
accounting. The issues as framed are: ( 1) Whether
Plaintiff is entitled to have the lots conveyed by the
corporation to the individual officers and directors accounted for at any other values than those fixed by the
same officers and directors; (2) Whether the Plaintiff
is entitled to have the property conveyed to other persons
than the officers and directors evaluated at any figure
other than that asserted by the corporation; and
(3) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to have the undi·
vided tracts of land which have been conveyed out of
the corporation evaluated as residential lots and if so,
at what value. (R. 195)
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These questions, the Court stated in the Pretrial
Order, arise out of the construction of the contract dated
August 8, 1957 "which the Trial Court will have to completely read and attempt to understand before this matter
is tried." (R. 196)
That Appellant is entitled to have Respondent "account" to him for the monies received from the sale of
the lots has never been disputed. Not only does the contract specifically so provide, but it has always been
conceded by Respondent corporation and was so conceded by it at the beginning of the trial. There is, therefore, little or no basis for limiting the matter solely to
considering an equitable accounting. In any event, however, there was no reason for construing the matter as
one for an equitable accounting rather than a common
law action for an accounting.
As stated in I Am. Jur. 2d, ACCOUNTS AND
ACCOUNTING, Section 45:
"The action of account is designed to provide
a remedy to compel a person who, by virtue of
some confidential or trust relation, has received
or been entrusted with money or property belonging to another or which is to be applied or disposed
of in a particular manner, to render an account
thereof, and to recover the balance found to be
due."
On the other hand, Section 51 states the following
with respect to the equitable action for an accounting:
"Equitable jurisdiction for an accounting is
usually put upon the following grounds: (1) the
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existence of a fidueiary relationship with a dutv
resting upon the Defendant to render an account·
(2) the existence of mutual account or if th~
accnunt is all on one side, the fact that the account
is complicated_; and (3) the need for a discovery.
A court may also assume jurisdiction where other
grounds for invoking equity, such as fraud, multiplicity or suits, etc., are present. However,
eqitity will not take jitrisdiction in itncomplicated
rnatters of account, absent some other ground for
equitable jitrisdiction, since to do so might involve
the eqitity courts in the trial of matters properly
tn"able in an ordinary assmnpsit action." (Emphasis added.)
Section 51 thereafter concludes:
"But 1vhere the principal purpose of a suit
is not a subject of equity jurisdiction, and the
discovery and accounting sought therein are
merely incidental and dependent on the main issues, equity will not generally take jurisdiction
on grounds of accounting."
These general principles of law have been adhered
to in this jurisdiction. In the case of H a.lloran-J11dgc
Trust Company vs. 11 eath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. :3±2, the
Supreme Court held that although the specific relief requested in the Complaint was an accounting and injunction, what the Plaintiff actually was entitled to, if
anything, was the recovery of money claimed to be owing
under a contract which was obtainable only in an action
at law.
In the case of Williams vs. Herring, 183 Ia. 127, 165
NW 342, the Iowa Supreme Court was concerned with the
problem of whether the action should be referred to
20

the equity side of the Court. Plaintiff's <Complaint alleged
8 violation by Defendant of certain terms of a written
contract entered into between the parties. Defendant
contended that inasmuch as there would be numerous
accounb involved in determining whether or not any
amount was due Plaintiff under the contract, the matter
~ltould be tr an sferred to the ec1uity side of the Court.
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In analyzing the matter the Court stated:
"Apparently, the principal reason for seeking
a transfer of this cause to equity is that same can
there be much more conveniently, and probably
efficiently, tried than at law. Conceding that this
is true, yet the pleadings do not disclose a controversy arising out of a matter cognizable in a
court of equity, and the relief sought upon the
first count is for a sum alleged to be due as
compensation and upon the second count for damages based upon an alleged violation of one of the
provisions of said contract. The question of mutual accounts is not, under the pleadings, involved.
The fact that the controversy involves a large
number of items of debit and credit arising out
of many business transactions, and that same
could be more conveniently tried to the Court, is
not a ground of equitable jurisdiction. The test
is not whether the cause can be more conveniently
or satisfactorilv tried and determined by the
Court than a ju;y but the accounts must be mutual
requiring an accounting, or there must be some
other ground or equitable cognizance not shown
to exist in this case."
Since under our constitution (Article VIII, Section
HJ) any distinction between actions at law and equity
has been abolished and there is but one form of civil
action ·what difference does it make whether the Court

'
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treated the matter as an equitable accounting or as an
action at law? Not only did this ruling result in undu]y
restricting and limiting the scope of inquiry in the ca8.e
(as will be discussed more particularly hereinafter), it
persuaded the Court to refuse Appellant a jury trial.
Although the Pretrial Order set the matter down for a
jury trial (R. 19-1), the Trial Court after determining
the action was for an equitable accounting dismissed the
jury and tried the case to the Court.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (which follow
quite closely the Federal Rules) provide that "the right
of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or a'
given by statute shall be preserved to the parties." (Rule
38(a)) Our statute, Section 78-21-1, U.C.A., 1953, provides:

"In actions for the recovery of specific real or
personal property, with or without damages, or
for money claimed a.s due itpon contract or as
damages for breach of contract, or for injuries,
an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unlrss
a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered."
(Emphasis added.)
Certainly the instant action is one "for money
claimed as due upon contract" as above defined. Unfortunately, however, the lower Court apparently was
unduly inflenced by the use of the phrase "action for
an accounting" without considering the over-all object
of the suit. In fact, the Court stated: "If there has been
a breach, then the parties are not entitled to an accounting. If the contract remains in force - binding upon the
parties - you are entitled to an accounting thereunder.''
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(R. 2G5)
;;tated:

And in its memorandum decision the Court

"Could not reconcile the conflicts of a demand
for an accounting under a contract intact and for
damages under a contract breached." (R. 207)
The Court never 4uite realized that it ·was the failure
to make an accounting according to the terms of the
contract which constituted the breach giving rise to the
adion by Appellant here; and the request for an accounting was only ancillary to the request that the rights
of the Appellant under the contract be determined. It
certainly ·was not neecssary, as the Court stated, for the
Plaintiff to rescind or disavow the contract in order to
secure relief for the breach thereof. (17 Am. J ur. 2d,
COKTRACTS, Section 445)
A noted case on the right to a jury trial in the
State of Utah is the case of N orback vs. Board of Directors of Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d
339, where the Court held that it was error to refuse the
Plaintiff a jury trial, in rendering its decision the Court
tJUoted from the earlier case of State ex rel Hansen vs.
Hart, 26 Utah 220, 72 P. 938, as follows:
If the principles to which appeal must be had
are principles of law in the main or primary action, either party thereto upon demand is entitled
to a trial by jury. This is true although application is made to the Court to exercise its equity
powers in granting injunctive relief. Where the
issues are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief
may be prayed for, to carry into effect the judgment based upon the legal issues is not sufficient
to deprive either party of his rights to have the
legal issues submitted to a jury."
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In th(• lat<'!' easp of T'ol!ey .1/orfllan; 1'. Fair1H111ks,
119 F. :.20-l-, 2:23 P. :Zd 739, (1950), om ~h1pn•1ne Comt
<>xtendf'd thr rnle laid do\rn in th<· X or hack Cas<' fmth 1'1'
in favor of gnarantt•Pinp; to tlH-' parti<•s the right to a
trial b.v jnr)-. The Fairbanks Cas<• involved an actirm
hy Plaintiff to Pnjoin D<·fondant from operating a funeral
business in allegPd violation of an agn•e11H·nt h<·t\reen
the parti<•s and for damages for past infraction:-; of tli1·
agreement. rrhe trial court, on tlw basis of the rule laid
down in tlw Xorbaek Case refm~ed a jnr:,· trial lwean~1·
the Conrt "conceives in the light of the pra)·er for relief
tlw parnmount object of the proeeeding is injunctive ...
that th(• qu<>stion is primarily equitable, that the damage
action ... is incidental to the primm')' relief; ... that the
partiP:s an~ not <>ntitled as a riµ;ht to a jm)· to tr» tli1•
cause."
The ;:)upreme Court after citing our statute on the
right to a jmy trial Jwld that tlw Dvf Pndant \'IP.s Pntitlerl
to a jury trial as to said damages regardless of tlw
primary or paramount object of the pron•<->ding. The
Court quoted with approval frorn the case of F(/rrell r.
City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 178 P. 7-W, as follo\\'s:
"There is no occasion in this state for the
application of the rule that equity, once taki~g
jurisdiction, will retain it for the purpose of disposing of the entire case, because here the C'onrt
may dispose of the entire case without the necessity of trying it as a case wholly of eq~it~ble
cogni:rnnce. Here the court, having jurisd1ct1on,
mav hear and determine the equitable issue aceording to the rules of equity, and the legal issues
in accordance with the rules of laws, both in the
same action."
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Om Com·t then stated:
"There is no persuasive reason why either
party should not be entitled upon timely demand
to a jury to determine the issues of fact raised by
the legal causes of action."
'11 he Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to consider the right to a trial by jury in a matter
involving an accounting under the Federal Rules of Civil
Prneedme (which have been adopted in this State in
rPspect to the matters referred to in the Court's opinion).
In Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 8 L. ed 2d 44, 82
S. Ct. 894, a complaint had been filed alleging a breach
of a written trademark licensing agreement by failure to
)lay the agreed amount for the exclusive right to use the
trndmrnrk within a certain territory. A temporary ancl
permanent injunction were requested along with an accounting to determine the exact amount of money O\ving
h? thP defendant and for judgment for that amount.
Tlw trial court refused the defendant a jury trial whereupon defendant petitioned for a writ of mandamus which
brought the matter before the Supreme Court for review.
Tlw Court discussed the history behind the right to a
trial by jury in Federal Court and as presently in effect
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

''At the outset, we may dispose of one of the
grounds upon which the trial court acted in striking the demand for trial by jury - that based
upon the view that the right to trial by jury may
he lost as to legal issues where those issues are
charncterized as 'incidental' to equitable issues for our previous decisions make it plain that no
such rule may be applied in the federal courts.
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In Scott v. N ePly, decided in 1891, this Court
held that a court of equity could not even takP
jurisdiction of a suit 'in which a claim proper]\
cognizable only at law is united in the same plead.
ings with a claim for equitable relief.' That holding, which was based upon both the historical
separation between law and equity and the duty
of the court to insure 'that the right to a trial L;.
a jury in the legal action may be preserved intact:·
created considerable inconvenience in that it nect-ssitated two separate trials in the same case
whenever that case contained both legal and equitable claims. Consequently, when the procedure in
the federal courts was modernized by the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
it was deemed advisable to abandon that part of
the holding of Seott v. Neely which rested upon
the separation of law and equit>r and to permit
the joinder of legal and equitable claims in a
single action. Thus Rule 18 (a) provides that a
plaintiff 'may join either as independent or a~
alternate claims as many claims either legal or
equitable or both as he may have against an oppo~
ing part.' And Rule 18 (b) provides: ,.Wherever
a claim is one heretofore cognizable only aftrr
another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion,
the two claims may be joined in a single action;
but the court shall grant relief in that action only
in accordance with the relative substantive rights
of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may st~te
a claim for money and a claim to have set a~1de
a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without f1~·st
having obtained a judgment establishing the claun
for money.'
The Federal Rules did not, however, purport
to change the basic holding of Scott v. N edy that
the right to trial by jury of legal claims must be
prt-servC"d. Quite the contrary, Rule 38 \a). ~x·
pressly reaffirms that constitutional pnnc1p e.
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declaring: 'The right of trial by jury as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the United States
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.' Nonetheless, after the adoption of the Federal Rules,
attempts were made indirectlv to undercut that
right by having federal cou;ts in which cases
involving both legal and equitable claims were
filed decide the equitable claim first. The result of
this procedure in those cases in which it was followed was that any issue common to both the
legal and equitable claims was finally determined
by the court and the party seeking trial by jury
on the legal claim was deprived of that right as
to these common issues. This procedure finally
came before us in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, a case which, like this one, arose from the
denial of a petition for mandamus to compel a
district judge to vacate his order striking a demand for trial by jury.
Our decision reversing that case not only
emphasizes the responsibility of the Federal
Courts of Appeals to grant mandamus where necessary to protect the constitutional right to trial
by jury but also limits the issues open for determination here by defining the protection to which
that right is entitled in cases involving both legal
and equitable claims. The holding in Beacon
Theatres was that where both legal and equitable
issues are presented in a single case, 'only under
the most imperative circumstances, circumstances
which in view of the flexible procedures of the
Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims.' That
holding, of course, applies whether the trial judge
chooses to characterize the legal issues presented
as 'incidental' to equitable issues or not. Consequently, in a case such as this where there cannot
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ev~n be a contention that an>T h•gal isstws for
wlueh a trial by jury is tirnel>T and properlv demanded lw submitted tu a jury."
·

':L1he Court then statl'd:
"Petitioner's eontention, as set forth in it'
petition for rnandamm; to the Court of A1J1wab
and reiterated in its hrids lwfore this Court is
that insofar as the complaint requests a mo:m
judgment it presents a claim which is unquestio~
ably legal. ~We agree with that contention ....
As an action on a debt allegl•dly dtw under a
contract, it would be difficult to conceive of an
action of' a more traditionally legal character."
The Court f'udlwr stated:
"The respondents' contention that this mon~)
claim is 'purely equitable' is based prirnaril,\- upon
the fact that their complaint is cast in terms of an
'accounting,' rather than in terms of an action for
'debt' or 'damages.' But the constitutional right
to (l trial lJy Jury cawwt be made to ,depc11d 11pv11
the choice of 1cords used in the plcadiugs. 'i'lw
necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a
snit for an equitable accounting, like all otlwr
equitable remedies, is, as \\'e pointed out in Beacon
Theatres, the absence of' an adequate remedy at
law. Consequently, in order to maintain sueh .a
suit on a cause of' action cognizable at law, as tlns
one is, the plaintiff must be able to show that tl11'
'aeeounts between the parties' are of' such a 'complicated nature' that only a court of' equity ('an
satisf'actorilv unravel them. In view of' the po\Hl'S
givPn to Dis.trid Courts hy Federal Hule of Civil
Prnc0dnre 53(b) to appoint maskrs to assist the
jury in those exceptional eases where the lega~
issues are too complicated for the jury adefluatel:
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to handle alone, the burden of such a showing is
considerably increased and it will indeed be a rare
case in which it can be met. But be that as it may,
this is certainly not such a case. A jury, under
pro1wr instructions from the court, could readily
dd<•nnine the recovery, if any, to be had here,
whC'ther the theory finally settled upon is that of
lireach of contract, that of trademark infringe11wnt, or any combination of the two. The legal
n•med:v cannot he characterized as inadequate
lll<'rely because the measure of damages may nec(•ssitate a look into petitioner's business records."
( Ephasis added.)
Vinall>· \H' wish to point out to the Court that Section
l'i-:;:3-9, Ptah Code Annotated 1953 provides that where
a Lh•(']araton· .Tndgment action "involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and
d1·f1·n11i1wd in tlw same manner as iss1ws of fact are
tri.,d and rletennined in other civil actions in the court
in \d1i«h tlw proeeedin2,' is pending."
B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT APPELLANT HAD TO PROVE THAT THE
CONDUCT OF THE PRINCIPALS OR RESPONDENT
CORPORATION IN DEALING WITH THEMSELVES
IN CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY FROM
RESPONDENT CORPORATION WAS DISHONEST
AND FRAUDULENT AS TO APPELLANT.

Appellant contends that under terms of the contract
it was the duty of Respondent corporation to effect
an orderly development of tlw property and sell the
l'P~i<lential lots at tlwir fair market value. Respondent,
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hoY1-e\TPr, conveyed more than half of the lots in subdivision 1 through -± to its sol(· stockholden;, offic<>rn and
directors "for a fix_ed and d.Pt('nnined consid(•ratio11 of
$3,000.00 lJer lot." r.I'he first conveyance of lots in subdivision No. 1 took place in X ovcrnhe1· 1959 wlwn 2i
lots \Vere conveyed for the rPcited consideration of $3,000.00 per lot. The next conveyance took place 18 months
later in .May 1961 when 1 lot was conveyed from snhdivision No. 1, 21 lots in subdivision No. 2 and 51 lob
in subdivision No. 3. The third conveyance was in Sqltember 1962, nearly three years after the first conveyance when 8 lots were conveyed in subdivision No. 4.
Further, the first conveyance in November 1959 occurred
within a fe-w days after the approval of the subdivision
and the recording of the plat so that it would have hl'en
iE1possible to have had any experience in determining
·what these lots would have sold for on the open market.
Nor does Respondent corporation claim that it ewr
offered the lots to the public at tlH:' same iuice which
it conveyed the lots to its sole officers and director~.
The purchase price of the lots offered to the public
from the same subdivisions ranged in pricP from $:),900.00 to $7,500.00. It is also significant to point out
that when the first conveyance was made by the Respondent corporation to its sole officers and director~
a sale was intended. In a letter written to Appellant an<l
Mr. N orvel E. Safford (one of th(~ other persons comprising Second Party) dated May 26, 1961, and signed
by both Owen \V. Bunker and C. Taylor Burton (then
the surviving directors and stockholders of Respondent
Corporation) the purported ci rcurnstances giving rise to
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the necessity for the conveyance are set forth. After
dating that it had been necessary for the sponsors to
make cash contributions to Respondent Corporation the
letter states that such contributions "have been secured
to the sponsors by the corporation deeding to them sufficient lots to equal the cash neecssary to keep the company's land payments current." (Exhibit 42-P)

The minutes of the Board of Directors of Respondent
Corporation record the transaction as follows:
"More money will be required before spring
lot sales can be made to carry the contract payments, so it appears the principals will have to
make further contributions. Mr. Bunker stated
he was unwilling to do so without at least some
kind of security for a return of some of the funds
already advanced. As a method of reducing the
Company's obligation to the principals he suggested each taking title to some lots to offset
some of the Company's borrowings. The lots
would be taken at cost, after determining same,
for $3,000.00 which was offered by Mr. Shaw, or
whichever was greater. Mr. Graff and Mr. Burton
<~ach agreed to this procedure. A future financing
for the Company is needed before sales are able
to pick up necessary contract payments, cash advances may be handled in the same manner."
(R. 34, 35)
Although the minutes also reflect certain offers had
he en made for lots in subdivision No. 1 for $3,000.00 per
lot as of November 1959, there was no attempt at any
time thereafter to obtain appraisals of the lots when
substantial numbers were conveyed in May of 1961 and
again when the transfer of eight lots was made in September 1962.
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Th(' lom•r court, both during th(' trial and in it,
l\frmorandum DPcision, intPrpreted the contract to require Appella11t to prove that the transaction 1whn·Pll
RPspomlPnt Corporation and its sole sto<'kl10ld\'rs, offi- '
CPrs and directors ,,-as m1consciona!Jl(', fraudulent anrl
unfair in order to fix a pricP on tlw lots conveypd to ,
such prineivals different from that \\·hich tlwy themselves fiX('d. In fact, the Findings of tlw trial eonrt
on this matter an• as follows:
"lS. The evidencp adduced by plaintiff did
not show had faith, unfair dealings, unreasonahle,
unconscionable or arbitrary conduct on the part
of Happy Y alley \\'ith regard to the transaction~ ,
referrPd to in 11-,indings 5, (), 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and E
nor was Happy Valley's conduct with regard
therf'to shovrn to be fraudulent as to plaintiff.
There has been no showing made that Happy
Valley acted unreasonably under the circumstances.'' (R. 215)

\Vitl10ut regard to whetlwr tlw Court llroperl~- interp1·etecl the provisions of tlw contract to limit Appellant to t lw actual "procPeds" regardless of tlw amount
thnPof, the det<>rmination that the burden was upon
A1ipellant to prov(' the unfairness or fraudul('nt nature .
of the transaction wherPby tlw corporation through it~ i
sole officers and directors conveyed 108 of its 150 subdividt>d lots to such officers and directors is clearly in
error. In considering the qrn•stion of the propriety of
the action of a director or officPr of a corporation in ,
acquiring corporate propPrty, Fletcher 011 Corporatious
(Permanent Edition) Rei;ised l'ol. No. 3, Sectio11 9-!9
states:
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"If the sale is actually, or in effect, made by
the officer to himself, as where he wholly or
partially represents the corporation and also is
the purchaser either as an individual or as a member of a firm or the like, the sale is voidable at
the option of the corporation merely because of the
relationship of the pa,rties and without regard to
whether the sale is a fair or an unfair one, according to the general rule already stated. Thus, a
director of a corporatio cannot become the pitrchaser of property of the corporation which it is
his duty to sell. Likewise, the president of a corporation has no authority to sell its goods to
himself, nor can he sell its future output to himself so as to cut off a prior vendor's lien of which
he as president was bound to take notice. So the
president of a corporation cannot purchase notes
belonging to the corporation from the corporation
as represented by himself and indorse them to
himself." (Emphasis added.)

It must be remembered here that the officers to
whom the property ·was conveyed were the persons who
authorized the conveyance and who had the duty as the
officrrs of the corporation to subdivide and sell the
property pursuant to the terms of the contract. Thus
the law is that the sale is voidable at the option of the
corporation merely because of the relationship without
regard to 'Whether the sale is fair or unfair. Again, as
~tated in Fletcher, ibid. Section 937:
"It is self-evident tha.t if a majority of the
directors are adversely interested, then any transaction between themselves and the corporation as
represented by its board of directors is simply a
case of officers dealing 1uith thernselves. It has
been held that the entire board of directors cannot
contract u:ith the corporation, since there is no
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one to represent the corporation. This is undoubtedly true if it merely means that such a
contract is voidable as distinguished from being
void. _Futhermore, such dealings undoubtedly arP
to be considered as dealings between interested
officers acting for themselves as one party to the
contract and acting for the corporation as the
other party to the contract, so as to authorize the
corporation to set aside the contract merely on
the ground of the relationship of the partie'
without reference to its fairness or the good faith
of the parties." (Emphasis added.)

Fletcher also discusses the responsibility on the part
of the offict.'r or director acquiring assets of property of
the corporation to prove the fairness of the transaction
(even where he is not dealing with himself because other
directors approved the transaction):
"In this connection, however, the question to
be considered is what are the presumptions and
upon whom the burden of proof rests where the
ground urged for setting aside the transaction
is that it is unfair or entered into in bad faith.
As to this matter, the courts agree that while there
is no presumption of unfairness or bad faith in
the first instance, unless the facts of the particular
case are such as to naturally raise such a presumption yet the burden is on the .director seeking to
uph~ld the transaction not only to prove the good
faith of the transaction but also to show its inh~r
ent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporat10
and those interested therein." (Ibid. Sec. 921)
11

A landmark case on this point is Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 84 L. ed 281, 60 S. Ct. 238 decided by thl'
Supreme Court of the United States. The Court tltet'l'
stated the law to be:
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"A director is a fiduciary. Twin-Lick Oil Co.
v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 588, 23 L. ed 329 330.
So is a dominant or controlling stockhold~r or
group of stockholders. Southern P. Co. v. Bogert,
250 U.S. 483, 492, 63 L. ed 1099, 1107, 39 S. Ct. 533.
Their powers are powers in trust. See Jackson v.
Lu de ling, 21 VY all, 616, 624, 22 L. ed 492, 495. Their
dealings with the corporation are subjected to
rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts
or engagements with the corporation is challenged
the bitrden is on the director or stockholder not
only to prove the good faith of the transaction but
also to show its inherent f alirness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 254
U.S. 590, 599, 65 L. ed 425, 432, 41 S. Ct. 209. The
essence of the test is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not,
equity will set it aside. While normally that fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly by the
corporation, or through a stockholder's derivative
action, it is, in the event of bankruptcy of the
corporation, enforceable by the trustee. For that
standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for
the protection of the entire community of interests
in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders.'-· (Emphasis added.)
It is to be noted that the Court specifically states
that the standard of fiduciary obligation is designed "for
the protection of the entire community of interests in the
corporation - creditors as well as stockholders." This,
of course, includes Appellant in the present situation
because he is a creditor of the corporation in connection
with any sale by the corporation of its lots, to the extent
of his interest in the proceeds of said sale.
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The principles enunciated above with respect to di.
rectors of a corporation <l(•aliHg with tlwmsdves as indi.
viduals were early recognized by onr Suprernp Court.
In the case of Bear Ri-i:er l'allcy Orchard Co. v. llruiley,
15 Utah 50G, ()() Pac. Gll, tlll' Court liPld:
"Agents cannot bind their principals by con.
tracts with respect to subject:-; in which they may
have opposing interests. In such a case tlwir ow;1
interests may interfere with their duty to their
principal. Self - interest may turn out to be a
stronger motive than their obligation to tlwir
principals. Under :-;uch circunrntances the law 1rill
not allow them to serve two masters, - to he led
into such temptation. Victor Gold & Silver Min.
Co. v. National Bank of the Republic (Utah) +9
Pac. 82G; \Vardell v. Railroad Co., 103 F.S. G51:
l\f echem, Ag. Secs. 455, 45G; 1 .Mor. Priv. Coq1.
Sec. 517; McGourkPy v. Railway, 14G U.S. 536,
13 Sup. Ct. 170."
In the later ease of Glen Allen J!i11i11g Co. r. Pork
Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 3G2, 296 Pac. 231, our Supreme Court reversed the trial eourt in res1wet to tlll'
transfer of certain corporate assets, holding:
"The authorities evr.rywhere recognize the
rule that, irhere n fiduciary relation is shown 111
exist, the u11rden is 11pon the fiduciary to sho11
good faith a11d fair dealing iu his relations 1rdh
his cestui qite trust. It is frequently said that the
relation of a director to his corporation is not that
of trustee and cestui que trust. But it does not
follow from that statement that the director is ~ot
bound by tlw same rules of good faith, full dis·
closurP, and fair dPaling as surrounds the trustee
in dealing ·with the cestui que trust. As age~ts
in trusted -with the management of the corporation
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for the benefit of the stockholders and creditors
they occupy a :fiduciary relation, and are held liable'
to the corporation as trustees. The liability of
directors and other officers to the corporation is
determined by substantially the same principles
which determine the liability of any other agent
to his principal for failure to perform the duties
which he has undertaken.
"Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1077, states the rules as follows:
"'As long as the confidential relation lasts
the trustee or other fiduciary owes an undivided
duty to his beneficiary, and cannot place himself
in any other position which would subject him
to conflicting duties or expose him cestui que
trust. The rule applies alike to agents, partners,
guardians, executors, and administrators directing and managing officers of corporations as well
as to technical trustees. The most important phase
of this rule is that which forbids trustees and
other fiduciaries from dealing in their own behalf
with respect to matters involved in the trust, and
this prohibition operates irrespectively of the
good faith or bad faith of such dealing.' " (Emphasis added)
:\Ion' recently in the case of Hansen v. Granite I-Ioldi11q Company, 117 Ftah 530, 210 P. 2d 274, the Court
set aside a purported sale and conveyance of real property by a corporation to a son of the prineipal stockholder

and president and general manager of the corporation.
Defendant had paid a total of $84,500.00 for the property
which wa:-; appraised during the course of trial from
$90,000.00 by Defendant's appraisers to $115,000.00 by
Plaintiff's appraisers. The Trial Court found the propel't~, to he rPasonably worth the sum of $100,000.00. On
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appeal, the Supreme Court announced the rule with re.
spect to corporate management dealing with the corpora.
tion as follows :
"But a fiduciary relation exists between the
board of directors and the management of the
corporation on one hand, and the stockholders on
the other and where the management is interested
in any deal with the corporation so that its interests are contrary to that of the corporation, then
its actions must be open and above board and their
dealings must be carried on with the utmost fairness and good faith. In such cases courts of equity
will carefully scrutinize the dealings of the management and set aside such transactions on slight
grounds. Noble Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant
Co-operative Inst., 12 Utah 213, 42 P. 869; Victor
Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. National Bank, 1~
Utah 391, 49 P. 826; Mcintyre v. Ajax Mining Co.,
17 Utah 213, 53 P. 1124; Erwin v. Oregon R. &
Nav. Co., C. C., 27 F. 625."

See, also, Clark and Wilson Lumber Co. of Delawarr
v. McAllister, (9 Cir.) 101 F. 2d 709; Mardel Securities,
Inc. v. Ale:x:andria Gazette Corp., (-! Cir.) 320 F. 2d 890. ,
1

In the light of the foregoing it is hard to understand
how the Trial Court could have concluded that Appellant
had to prove that the conduct of the sole stockholderi.
officers, and directors of Respondent Corporation (in
conveying Respondent's real property to themselves)
was unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable. In fact,
however, Respondent's own evidence clearly demon
strates that except for the initial conveyance in November
of 1959, the lots conveyed by the principals to themselvef
were worth considerably in excess of the amount which
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\\'as determined to be the purchase price. :Mr. C. Francis
Solomon called as a witness for the Respondent Corporation testified that he was a professional fee appraiHer; that he had made appraisals of the lots in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 as of the dates on which
the transfers had been made from Respondent Corporation to its principals. His appraisal was made on the
basis .of individual lots and is summarized in Exhibit
59-D. (R. 1199-1202) The Exhibit in question which contains his appraisal reveals that of the 28 lots appraised in
subdivision No. 1, only 18 were appraised at $3,000.00
or less and the average appraisal for the lots in such
subdivision as of November 1959 was $3,080.00 per lot.
With respect to the 20 lots conveyed by the Respondent
to its officers and directors from subdivision No. 2 in
May 1961, none were appraised at $3,000.00 or less and
the average appraisal was $3,660.00 per lot. In respect
to the 52 lots conveyed in l\:Iay of 1961 from subdivision
~o. 3, only 3 lots were appraised at $3,000.00 or less and
the average appraisal was $3,500.00 per lot. Of the 8 lots
appraised in subdivision No. 4 as of September 1962,
none were appraised at $3,000.00 or less and the average
appraisal for said lots was $3,500.00. The total difference
lwtween the "price" used by Respondent's principals in
conveying the lots to themselves and the fair market
vaJue of these lots at the time of such conveyance as
appraised by Respondent's own witness is $45,050.00.
Since Mr. Solomon's appraisal was the only independent
appraisal submitted by Respondent Corporation during
the trial of the case as to the lots in subdivisions 2, 3, and
~' the trial Court would have concluded under any cir39
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cumstances that the transaction \n:ls fair and equitahlP
to all persons interested therein.

This does not consider the appraisals of Don W.
Stahle and Edward .M. Ashton, both of whom submittt·d
appraisals to Respondent as to the lots in subdivision
No. 1 as of N overnber 1959. J\f r. Stahle appraised tlw
lots of the average fair market value of $3,500.00 ver
lot (Exh. 9-D); and l\Ir. Ashton appraised the same
lots to be of the average fair market value of $3,4:50.00
per lot. Using these figures as a basis for value of the
lots in subdivision No. 1 instead of Mr. Solmon's figure~ ,
for such subdivision would increase the difference between what the principals took the lots for and what the
fair market value \Yas from $±5,050 to $57,810.00. Nor
does this take into consideration the fair market valnP
of the lots testified to by the several witne>sses who \rerP
called by Appellant. These figures are substantiall)·
higher than the figures of 1\Tr. Solomon. (Exh. 38-P)

1

c.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND
MAKE FINDINGS IN RESPECT TO THE RIGHTS
OF APPELLANT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
CONTRACT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PROPERTY, THE SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT.

Although the Pretrial Order specifically states that
the action is one "for declaratory relief as to the rights
of the Plaintiff" and sets forth that one of the claims
of the Plaintiff is that he is entitled to a declaratory
judgment determining his rights under the August 8,
1957 contract as to accountings, times of pa:rnwnt and
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the rate and manner of development of the properties,
the subject of the Agreement,'' the Court refused to con~i<ler an)' testimony regarding the terms of the contract
\rith respect to the development of the properties and
made no findings in reference to the rights of the Appellant in respect thereto. (R. 196)
'l'lw Agr<,ement of August 8, 1957 between the parties

recites that First Party (Respondent) is the owner or
Pntitled to sell certain land situated in Salt Lake County
denominated the "entire premises" and desires to
clfn,'elop those premises to subdivide a portion thereof
for n·sidPntial building lots and reserve a suitable portion for use as a golf course. The Agreement further
rPcite::.; that it is the intention and desire of Second Party
(ineluding Appellant herein) to effect the organization of
the Willow Creek Country Club for the purpose of buying
and dewloping a portion of the entire premises as a
golf course. (R. 137) The contract then provides that
First Party agrees to sell and Second Party agrees to
aequire the portion of the entire premises for a golf
eonnw and First Party further agrees to furnish culinar)' and irrigation ·water to satisfy the needs of the
Country Club.
First Party then agrees to use its best efforts to
e::rnse the balance of the entire premises to be zoned for
C'la::.;s "A" residential purposes and agrees to develop,
:-nbdivide, and sell as residential lots and a shopping
CPnter in conjunction therewith all of the entire premises
PXCt>pt those sold for Club purposc->s. Paragraph 6 of the
Contract specifically states that "said entire prc->mises
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shall not he sold or developed in any other manner excejl!
upon the written consent of Second Party."
The Court made no finding as to the responsibilit)·,
if any, of First Party to make an orderly development
of the property or to subdivide and sell the property as
residential lots as contended for by Appellant nor did
it make any finding in reference to this matter. Thi.,
Court has repeatedly held, both before and since tlw
adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that
findings must respond to and cover all the material
issues raised by the pleadings \\·hether evidence respecting them was or was not adduced and if there be no such
express or simplied findings the judgment has no support.
See Simper v. Brown, 7-± u tah 178, 278 P. 529. In tht·
recent case of Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 r.
2d 43, 278 P. 284, The Court held:
"The defendant's answer raised the issue of
abandonment of the contract but the trial court
made no finding regarding it. Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 52 provides:
'In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury * * * the court shall, unless the same was
waived, find the facts specially and stat~ separ·
ately its conclusions of law thereon and duect the
entry of the appropriate judgment; * * • .'

''It appears that. the judgment was based
principally upon the findings that the contract
v\·as entered into and the commission had not been
paid, totally disregarding· defendant's answer to
the complaint. It has been frequently held that th~
failure of the trial court to make findings 01
fact on all material issues is reversible error
where it is prejudicial. Hall v. Sabey, 58 Uta 1
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343, 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257
P. 637; Prows v. Howley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31;
Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah a78, 278 P. 529; West
v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P. 2d 292;
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235, 79 P. 2d 1010."
We submit that by the lower court concluding that
tlw action ~was for an equitable accounting only it failed
to consider and pass upon all the issues raised by the
Pretrial Order and therefore that the judgment should
he rewrsed for this matter to be considered and resolved.
D.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR AND
RECEIVE CERTAIN TESTIMONY.

By the Court limiting the trial to a hearing of an
equitable accounting at the outset of the trial, Appellant
\ras very limited in the nature of the testimony which
he could adduce. Even so, there were times during the
trial when evidence was excluded that would have related
directly to the good faith of the principals of Respondent
Corporation in dealing with themselves. During the
l'ourse of examination of Mr. Owen W. Bunker, Appellant
offerpd to prove by the witness that several lots received
hy him from the Respondent were resold at substantially
higher prices; that in September 1961 Lot 561 in subdivi~ion No. l was sold to Leon J. Nicolaides for the price
of $7,500.00; that on October 9, 1961 Lot 37 in subdivision
;\ o. 2 was sold to Richard Prows, Inc. for $7 ,500.00 in
cash; that Lot 33 in subdivision No. 2 was sold to the
Johnsons on October 4, 1963 for $6,500.00 and Lot 32
in subdivision No. 2 was sold to the Rowleys on May 21,
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1963 for $7,200.00; that Lot 21 in subdivisi1
sold to the Mc Kays on ,July 12, ] ~)()2 for
Lot 26 ·was sold to Award Honws on Octobe
$6,000.00 cash. (R. 582, 583) Avrwllant fu
to show hy the tt>stimony of Mr. C. Taylor
on April 15, 1%2 he sold Lot 9 in suhdivi:
the Gordons for $G,OOO.OO; that on 1\tay 2,
Lot 8 in subdivision No. 3 to Ferre for $
Lot 27 in the same subdivision to the 1\1a1
000.00; that he sold Lot 28 in the subdivii
Gordon and Bush on July 1, 1963 for $7,0(
54 in the same subdivision to Donald Dysoi
8, 1963 for $6,000.00 and Lot 55 to a LeRoy :
same terms as the sale for Donald Dyso1
would testify that he sold Lot 10 in subd
to Gordon and Bush in April 1963 for $
additional terms being involved. (R. 585, ~

In denying the proffer of proof the C(

"The court takes note of the pr
objections made, and it appears to 1
this is a proffer of the - of some of
of a sale, and without proof of any e;
of any competent witness with r4
comparability of the proffered sal
sales with respect to which plaintif
the accounting now made is unconsc
reasonable in the light of the obj
summarizing those and the views
I think the law is that proof of a
alone is no proof of comparable sal
proof of the fair market value of t
which plaintiff claims the accountin.
defendant js unconscionable or
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Accordingly, the off er is refused." (R. 591)

the pro ff er of proof -

Appellant submits, howev~r, that the foregoing eviclenee was material and relevant and should have been
received where the principals took conveyance of lots
from the Coropration for the sum of $3,000.00 per lot
and in turn sold them for $6,000.00 to $7 ,500.00 per lot.
Therefore, this testimony was admissible and should have
been considered by the Court in determining whether or
not the conduct and actions of the directors was in fact
conscionable and fair as far as the Appellant is concerned.
In the course of examination of C. Taylor Burton by
Hespon<l(~nt Corporation, the witness identified certain
appraisals which had been obtained by the stockholders,
officers and directors of Respondent Corporation. (Exhs.
S-D to 13-D) Most of these appraisals we1·e dated approximately a year after the conveyance but ref erred to the
date of sale as the value date. Upon being examined on
Yoir dire by Appellant, 1lr. Burton testified that these
appraisals were used in the negotiations with the Federal
(Jovt>rmnent on tax questions which concerned the value
of the pro1wrty taken by the stockholders and directors
from th(' Corporation. (R. 371) Subsequently, in the
course of cross examination of :Mr. Burton, Appellant
attempted to inquire further into the matter by asking
him concerning the difficulty with the Federal Government which necessitated their revaluing for tax purposes
tlw 24 lots received by them from the Corporation in
suhdivision No. 1.
An objection by Respondent was sustained by the
Court thereby precluding Appellant from ascertaining
45

what value the parties had accepted with the Federal
Government, in connnection ·with which the very exhibits
which had been received' in evidence was used. Thi8
again was material and relevant in determining the fair.
ness of the transaction behveen the principals and the
Corporation.
We respectfully submit that the errors committed by
the trial court in the analysis and determination of the
issues in the case and in the limitation of the evidence
received in the matter requires this Court to reverse the
judgment and send it back for a new trial before a jury.
IL
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT OF AUGUST
8. 1957.

Not only did the trial court misconstrue the isslm
in the case and fail to consider all of them, it likewi8e
failed properly to interpret the contract between the
parties and failed to give effect to all of its terms. It
is a well recognized principle of law that it is not only
for a breach of express promises in a contract that a
person is liable, but also for a breach of implied promise~
as well. As stated by Williston on Contracts, Rei·iscd
Edition, Fol. 5, Sec. 1293:
"Since the governing principle in the ~onna:
tion of contracts is the justifiable assumption b~
one party of a certain intention on th.e pa~ 0a
another the undertaking of each pronnssor m
contract' must include any promises wh"i~ l1 a
reasonable person in the position.of the promis~e~
would be justified in understanding or rnclude ·
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In the case of Watson Brothers Transportation Co.,
Inc. v. Jaffa (B Cir.) 143 F. 2d 340, the Court made the
following statement:
"Aside from the allegation of the petition that
Jaffa did make such an agreement, it is to be noted
that although the written agreement contains no
express provision that Jaffa will cooperate with
vV atson Bros., Inc., to meet the formal requirements for approval of an application for permission to operate trucking routes under a lease,
it is well settled that a contract includes not only
the terms set forth in express words, but in addition all implied provisions indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties and carry out the
contract, and in the absence of which the contract
could not be effectively performed. Sacramento
Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329, 47 S. Ct. 368,
71 L. ed 663; New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 10 Cir., 108 F. 2d 65, 69; Montrose
Contracting Co. v. Westchester County, 2 Cir., 94
F. 2d 580, 582; American Central Insurance Co.
v. McHose, 3 Cir., 66 F. 2d 749, 751; Baldwin
Rubber Co. v. Paine & Williams Co., 6 Cir., 1107
F. 2d 350, 353; Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1293
et seq.; see Cornell Law Quarterly 615; 23 Minn.
Law Rev. 189. In determining whether the principle is applicable, the nature of the contract, the
circumstances under which it was made, the situation of the parties and the objects they had in view
in making the contract should be considered."
(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case Appellant contends that where
RPS}Jondent transferred lots to its sole stockholders, offirers and directors, the Court should have required it
to account on the basis of the fair market value at the
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time of such conveyance or in the alternative treated thP
matter as not being a salP until the~ principals in turn
sold such lots at which time the amonnt received by the 111
would be treated as the gross proceE~ds. Certainly therP
vrns an ''implied" agreement that the Respondent Corporation would not sell the lots to its sole stockholder~,
officers and directors for a price less than the fair market value thereof.
In the case of Reback v. Story Proditction, 111c. !I
A.D. 880, 193 N.Y.S. 2d 520, the New York Court held
that an agreement whereby a buyer of exclusive motion
picture and television rights undertook to pay tlw seller
a guaranteed minimum and iwrcentage of proce('ds in
excess thereof also imposed the duty on the buyer to
<>xploit the rights in l't~spect to which the ro~"alty 'ra'
to be paid and at least to use its best efforts to sPll
and dispose of the film contracts so as to create a i1roceeds from which to pay the percentage. Again, i11 till'
case of Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. N eisloss, 8 N.I.
2d 723, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 101, the Court of Appeals of Ne11
York held that where a lessor rented a store to a lessPr
with a "percentage' lease clause and covenanted not tu
rent other space in the same building for similar usr
and a plot plan attached to the lease showed an adjoining
vacant lot, not uwned by the lessor, the lessor could not
thereafter acquire such adjoining property and lease the
same for a similar use.
A good discussion on the question of ·what is meant
by "proceeds" in connection with an oil and gas lease
is found in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, (5 Cir.)
48

1;)5 F. 2d 185. There the Court was concerned with the
intPrpretation of a clause in a lease providing for the
payment to the lessor of 1/8 of the "net proceeds'' derived from the sale of gas at the mouth of the well. There
11as a further provision in the contract relating to oil
1\·hich used the expression "current market price." The
Court held that where the lessee used some of the gas
to manufacture a different compound, lessor would be
Pntitled to receive his proportionate cost of the fair
market value of the gas. w·e quote from the Court's
<li:-:cussion:
"The law often resorts to 'fair value' or 'fair
market value,' when 'market price' is stipulated
and there is no market, or when 'proceeds' are
stipulated and there is no sale. This is because
the contract evidently intends payment shall be
made, and value is the nearest approach possible
under the circumstances to the measure of payment contracted for."
Tt is interesting to note that in the Phillips Case the
Conrt detPnnined that the accounting between the parties
to an oil and gas lease was properly tried as an action
at law hefore a jury.
Certainly the Court should have construed the term
"gross proceeds" to mean not less than fair market value
if Hespondent was going to convey the lots to its sole
Ktockholders, officers and directors.
As heretofore stated, Paragraph 6 of the Agreement
h0tween the parties provides that "it is the intention of
Fir::;t Party to develop, subdivide, and sell as residential
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lots, and as shopping center in conjunction therewith all
of said entire premiS('S, l'XCt>pt the Club lH'emisPs," 'anri
further that "said entire premises shall not be sold 01
conveyed in any other manner except upon the writtPJi
consent of Second Party." ( R. 51) (Emphasis added.)
N ohvithstanding this provision Respondent Corporation
madl~ conveyances of propert~, other than as residPntinJ
lots. On or about .J anua1·y 29, 1962 Respondent conveyed
a tract of approximatelv
. 30 acrPs (31.07 acres hY. actual
snrvey) to Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. and R. E. Mc
Conaughy in exchange for their interest (as part 01
Second Party) in the very contract in ql'.tistion. (R. 31.
32) The TwentyFive Associates, Inc. and Mr. Conaughy
owned a total of 50.9% of the interest in Second Part:
according to the contract. ( R. 53) Appellant contendPd
that this conveyance ·was in violation of the provision~
of the contract and that he was entitled to recover hii
proportionate share of the fair market value of thi>
acreage as it would have been divided into residential loL
and sold as such as of th<> date of the conveyance. When
Appellant attempted to have George B. Gudgell, a licensed land surveyor and consulting engineer, testify a!
to lmw the tract in question could have been diveded intP
residential lots, an objection by the Respondent wai
sustained. (R. 288) Thereaftt>r wlwn Appellant attempted :
to adduce testimony as to the value of this propert)· I
as individual lots, the Court sustaim•d objection thereto,
stating that he was construing the contract to require ,
Respondt>nt Corporation "to sell for residential lot~"
and that Respondent Corporation \\'as not required to
sell the property lot h)' lot as residC>ntial lots. (R. +951 •

I
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1'his same view was expressed in the Court's Supplemental Decision wherein stated that since the tract was
wnPd for residential use it was sold for residential lots
l'\'en though sold as an entire tract. (R. 210)
\Ve submit that the language of the contract is unl'((Uivocal and requires the property to be subdivided and
f'old a~ lots in order to assure that the highest price be
obtained for such property. In any event, if there was
any ambiguity in the contract such ambiguity should have
br'('Jl the subject of parole evidence for the purpose of
l'xplaining the provision and assisting the Court in detPrrnining what interpretation should have been placed
upon the contract. The Court apparently took the position that since the third sentence of Paragraph 6 of the
contract provides that the gross proceeds of sales of all
such property ''sold for residential lots'' shall be divided,
etc., and if the property were zoned for residential purposes and sold for the ultimate use as residential lots this
satisfied the provision of the contract. However, it is
Appellant's position that the use of the word "for" in
the third sentence and the use of the word "as" in the
first and second sentence connotes the same meaning and
that the property is to be sold as residential lots and the
proceeds of such sale divided between the parties.
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition, defines the word "as" to be "in the idea, character,
or capacity of." This definition was accepted by the
lllinois Supreme Court in the case of Tallman v. Eastern
Illinois and Peoria Railroad Co., 3'79 Ill. 441, 41 N.E. 2d
;i37 involvinO'
the 0O'ivinO'
of a deed "as and for" a right
0
0
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of way. Likewise Webster defines the word "for" tri
mean "as being"; also "equivalent to which, anything
is regarded or treated." In the case of Atkins v. Atki 1,,.
70 Vt. 5G3, 41 Atl. 503, a ]iolicy of insurance payable 111
Alfr0d Atkins, Trustee, ''and the children of Jiyrm11
Atkins" was constnwd to mean that the policy was pay
able to Alfred Atkins as Trustee for the children. ThP
word "and" here m0aning "for." Thus the Court construed "for" as meaning "as" in substitution for th1
word "and."
Not only did the Court sanction the sale of tracts of
land other than "as" residential lots, it failed to award
to Appellant his proportionate share of the proceedi.
In the case of the transfer of the 31.07 acres to Twent)
Five Associates, Inc. and McConaughy, tlw Court did not
give to Appellant either his proportionatt> share of th1•
actual proceeds received for such transf (:'r nor his percent
of its fair market value. The transfer of the acreage t11
Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. and ~IcConaughy was madP
in exchange for their 50.9% interest in the contract.
Rather than give Appellant his percent of this considrration the Court converted the valm• of the 50.9% intcrefl
in the contract into a mondary figure and awarded to
Appellant the proportionate amount of such monetary
figure.
Appellant claims that lw should be entitled to hii
proportionate amount of the fair market 1:aluc of tlw
property, at the tinw of the convP~'ance, as residcnti~l
lots. The trial court accepted Respondent Corporation.i
determination of the value of interest received by it
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from l\foConaughy and Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. This
rnlue, as testified to by :Mr. Burton, was arrived at by
taking the amount paid to N. E. Safford and American
ln:o;urance Agency for their interest in the contract and
n·lating such figure to the percent of interest obtained
from Twenty-Five Associates, Inc. and McConaughy. He
kstifif~d that the American Insurance Agency interest of
S.~j~ was acquired for $7,000.00 and that the Safford
interest of 5% plus the Bradshaw interest of 4.1 % (making a total of 9.1 %) was acquired for the sum of $7,588.80.
On this arbitrary basis it was determined that the interest
of the T\\'enty-Five Associates, Inc. and McConaughy
(50.9%) \\·as worth the sum of $42,922.95. (R. 1152)

There was no attempt at any time by Respondent
Corporation to determine the fair market value of the
:n.07 acres conveyed to Twenty-Five Associates and
~frConaughy, either as an entire tract or as individual
lots. On the other hand appraisers for Appellant testified that the fair market value of the property as an
Pntire tract and not as individual lots was from $124,000.00 (tPstified to by \Verner Kiepe - R. 904) to $133,750.00 (testified to by Melvin Teerlink - R. 795).
The finding of the Court in respect to this particular
trnrt was to the effect that the "stated agreed and
acwpted gross proceeds received by Happy Valley for
this conveyance was the respective interests of the
grnntc>es as irnrt of Second Party in said agreement,
liC'ing a total of 50.9% thereof and being of the reasonable
cash value of $42,908.00." (R. 213) It is thus evident
lhat the Court did not even attempt to determine the
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fair markt>t value of tht> property conveyed but only tr
assess tlw reasonable cash vahw of the proceeds h•.
Happy Valley. Appellant contends that he was entitlPu
to receivt> his proportionatr share of the fair market
value of tlw property as individual lots or in any !'Y\'nt
his percent of the actual proceeds received. See, Phillipi
Petroleum Co. v. J olmson, supra.
Again, the rrcord shows that Respondent Corpora
tion conveyed to Estates, Inc. approximately 21/~ acres ot
real propt>rty on May 22, 19G2. This was likewise a con
veyance in bulk ratht>r than as st>parate individual lot.'.
Here again the consideration received for the convevaner·
of said property ·was something other than cash. Happ~
Valley reecived the benefit of certain offsite improwments, \vhich the Court dl'tennined was of the ya]ui·
of $13}-±2.85 (Finding N" o. 9, R. 213) \YP submit that
Appellant was and is entitled to receive his proportionafr
share of the fair market value of this property apprai~r·rl
as individual lots and not as a whole tract. Like1risr"
Appellant should be t>ntitled to recPive consideration for
the transfer by Respondent Corporation to Salt Lakt
·water Conservancy District of a tract of land approxi
mately 100 feet wide by 130 fed (approximately the siz1•
of a lot) which property was transferred as a well-:;;itt
and location for a pump house. The Court refused to
receive evidence of the value of this tract of land and
also as to the amount of revenue stamps placed upon
the deed of transfrr. (R 1165, Exh. 58-P) Appellant
a()"ain
submits that he should be entitk,d to receive hii.
b
proportionate share of the fair market value of thii
tract.
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SUl\IMARY
Tn n~YiFwing the evidence and presenting his position
Appellant has refrained from relying on the testimony of
,\.ppellant's expert witnesses as to the value of the propl'rty. Tl1is should not be construed as abandoning such
t•Yidenc<'. However, it was felt that even without refer1·nce to such testimony the error of the trial court was
plainly man if estccl.
To have attempted to delineate all of the testimony
in this case would have further demonstrated the extreme
diffieult circumstances under which Appellant had to
prl'sent his evidence. In fact we believe that the remarks
of this Court in the case of Board of Education of Salt
Lulcc City v. Bothwell and Swaner Company (decided
:\.pril 2, 1963) 400 P. 2d 568 are equally applicable here.
The Court there remarked:
"The trial court may have had a labor pain
or two induced by an unnecessary protraction of
a very simple case that took over 600 pages of
transcript to establish its simplicity. We are sure
that the trial court really did not mean it when
it said that 'having take'n only 1962 prices, and
without having considered anything in 1960, the
court is of the view that Nielsen considers the 1962
prices more favorable to the landowner here who
called him to testify.' The implication of dishonesty on the part of the witness is distasteful
Pnon(J'h
under the evidence here; but it is more
b
'
unforgivable for the trial court, in the middle of
direct examination, punctuated by an erroneously
permitted, but premature cross-examination, u~
der the aura of the glittering magic words "voir
dire" to evaluate the credibility of the witness,
whi~h, at that juncture, was none of its business,
hut that of the jury."
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.Mr. \Verner Kie1w, an Pminently qualifiPd real rstate
appraiser, had hardly begun to ksti [~; with respect to
comparablP sales mwd by him in th<' com·sp of his a~
praisal when in tlw cours<' of being interrupted on a
so-called void dire examination, tlw Court said: "lf the
witness doesn't use more care about what lw considen
comparables than statement just made hy cournwl wou!Q
indicate, then I may not heli( Ve an.\· of his tPstimony.''
1

\Vith this sort of a prejudgment of the testimom
of the witness, it is no wonder that the Court concludeu
in its Memorandum Opinion that it did not beliew the
testimony of this witness.
Appellant respectfully ::mbmits that thP trial court
erred in its analysis of the issues in this easP and in
refusing to grant Appellant a jury trial, that the Court
improperly eonstnwcl and dPfined the ternls of the con·
tract and failPd to award to Appellant any sum of money
for certain sales and conveyances made by Respondeni
to third parties; that in any event the trial court failea
to make a dPtermination of tht' rights of APlwllant under
the contract and failed to n'quire Hespondent to show
the good faith of tlw trarnmetions in whieh it made con·
veyanees to its sole stockholdPrs, officers, and directors.
\Ye resp<>ctfull,\· submit that tlw judgnwnt of the trial
eourt should be n'Vl'rsecl and a new trial granted.
Respectfull,\· subrnittPd,

ARTHUR IL NIELSEN
,
FRANKLYN B. l\f ATHESO~
Nielst>n, Conder & Hansen
510 N P\\·house Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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